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Alasdair MacIntyre’s analysis of the conditions of contemporary work in his Ethics in the Conflicts 
of Modernity is, unsurprisingly, descriptive of a U.S. medical system plagued by bureaucracy 
making it difficult for clinicians to live up to the ideals of their practice.1 Education in bioethics 
should respond in ways that prepare a practitioner to safeguard her moral agency and promote the 
ends of her healing practices. The question an ethics course or training program needs to answer 
is, “How will this education equip students to be moral agents and to care for patients ethically in 
the complex settings in which they will work?” 
The first task of creating an ethics education program is to understand the kinds of challenges 
students will face in their future practice. Here I will begin by describing the forces at work in 
modern medicine. I will then describe the state of typical bioethics education. I will show how 
bioethics, much like academic philosophy, “marched off in the wrong direction.”2 I will argue that 
bioethics education is overly focused on principles and quandary ethics, and that an approach to 
ethics education focused on growing in virtue would be a more effective way to promote ethical 
practice. To conclude, I will suggest the types of programs in moral formation and ethics training 
that need to be more prevalent in medical schools and residency programs. 
 
1. A MacIntyrean Diagnosis of the Problem of Contemporary Medicine 
Clinicians practice the healing art of medicine within an increasingly complex set of institutional 
requirements dictating the way they must provide care at the bedside. Among many elements 
putting pressure on health systems to operate efficiently, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has 
emphasized the need to provide high quality, low cost care. In particular, the Values-Based 
Purchasing Program—whereby federal funding is provided based quality, efficiency, Hospital 
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) patient satisfaction 
surveys, and meaningful use of electronic medical records (EMR)—has necessitated reforms in 
health care operations over the past decade.3 Against the background of the litigious culture in the 
U.S. compelling providers to practice defensive medicine, caregivers are under an enormous 
amount of pressure. Each of these realities places demands on clinicians that are in addition to the 
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responsibility of caring for patients. I will give a brief overview of some of the ways the external 
stressors of practicing medicine today affect clinicians. As they develop curricula, educators need 
to be mindful of this context. 
Unsurprisingly, the extensive reimbursement and compliance-related information that must be 
documented in the EMR is associated with more time in front of a screen and less time spent face-
to-face with patients. One estimate is that, for every hour of time spent with patients, physicians 
are spending another one to two hours on documentation, and the time spent documenting often 
bleeds into clinicians’ personal time.4 The increased “clerical burden” distracts from the real 
meaning of the work of medicine,5 which is why the EMR is a likely factor in physician burnout.6 
Particularly striking is one study that found that physicians would grade current EMR systems an 
“F” in usability (against a standard metric for usability of technology).7 Although the shift to 
keeping records electronically was theoretically intended to improve communication, patient 
safety, and quality, those outcomes have yet to be achieved, and discouraging errors still occur.8 
Nonetheless, the EMR has now become a necessity and requirements for documentation are likely 
to continue increasing.9 
As they are juggling the administrative aspects of their job, clinicians are also acutely aware of 
the satisfaction surveys their patients will receive after their visits, which are often used as a 
measure of quality care. The HCAHPS survey includes questions on communication with 
clinicians, pain management, experience of the hospital environment, and satisfaction with 
discharge and medication information.10 Organizationally, reduction in funding is a serious 
consequence of low patient satisfaction. Further, a facility’s HCAHPS scores in part affect funding 
from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), incentivizing high patient satisfaction 
scores. However, caregivers working in hospitals serving minority populations tend to have lower 
HCAHPS scores, creating a feedback loop making it more difficult for them to get funding that 
could improve patient satisfaction,11 and ultimately putting more pressure on the caregivers doing 
this difficult work. 
Clinicians have always been mindful of patient satisfaction because of the risk of litigation. 
Even if the prosecution is unlikely to win a case, the stress and cost of a lawsuit are themselves 
burdensome, given their potential impacts on reputation, financial stability, and well-being.12 As 
a result, physicians have to practice defensive medicine, which is often incongruent with what they 
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believe to be optimal care.13 Defensive medicine is also an obstacle to good communication,14 
which is ironic since communication issues are a key cause for lawsuits in the first place.15 
All of these stressors are external to the practice of medicine, and the activities required of 
clinicians in response to these realities fall outside the scope of the practice of medicine itself. 
MacIntyre identifies the problems that go along with working in this kind of climate. He notes two 
types of activity in work, “one a mode of practice in which workers are able to pursue ends that 
they themselves have identified as worthwhile, in the pursuit of which they hold themselves to 
standards of excellence that they have made their own, the other an organization of activity such 
that their work is directed toward ends that are the ends of administrators and managers imposed 
upon their activities.”16 Later, he notes that “it matters that [workers] understand what they are 
doing and that their standards are ones that they have made their own, not standards imposed by 
external managerial control.”17 Physicians enter the practice of medicine for the healing activity 
of the work, but find themselves accountable to the demands that the healthcare system puts on 
them, which were not the same as the standards they imposed on themselves. At its worst, 
MacIntyre warns that individuals could be used as “cost-effective means to ends imposed by others 
for the sake of high productivity and profitability.”18 Yet, according to MacIntyre, growth as a 
moral agent is contingent upon participation in activities that an individual herself values.19 She 
cannot exercise her moral agency if she feels like a cog in a machine rather than, in this case, a 
healer. This tension can affect practice to the point where the pursuit of the original ends of 
medicine is compromised. This sort of bureaucracy in medicine is nothing new. Even in the 1970s, 
MacIntyre lamented the ways in which the doctor-patient relationship had suffered because of it.20 
Externally-imposed expectations for high productivity and efficiency lead to changing practice 
in a way that physicians know does not comport with their ideal practice of medicine. The more 
“efficient” the care, the less actual care can be provided.21 Patients and families want real care, and 
clinicians want to give real care, but the structure makes it difficult to do so. Unsurprisingly, the 
results are moral distress and burnout. 
Moral distress is unlike other forms of ethical dilemmas because it happens when an agent 
knows the morally correct thing to do, but a constraint prevents him from carrying out the action. 
In the case at hand, a physician knows what the goods of his practice of medicine are, and the time 
that needs to be spent to provide compassionate care, but the system prevents him from being able 
to practice in that way. Without using the term, MacIntyre describes moral distress: “exploitative 
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structures […] make it often difficult and sometimes impossible to achieve the goods of the 
workplace through excellent work.”22 It is at this point when clinicians start to burn out. Burnout 
is a current crisis in medicine, with about half of physicians reporting it.23 Aside from the toll 
burnout takes on the individual experiencing it, in clinical settings it is linked to reduced quality 
of patient care.24 It places the vocation of a physician at risk and is dangerous for patients. The 
prevalence of moral distress and burnout is a large-scale ethical crisis to which ethics education 
must attend. 
It is tempting to scapegoat healthcare leaders and institutions for creating the conditions under 
which clinicians suffer moral distress and burnout. However, it is important to note that healthcare 
organizations themselves have their hands tied. Healthcare leaders are under their own kind of 
external constraints, as the institutions are under financial pressures to ensure their ability to 
provide care into the future. This reality is unlikely to change, and MacIntyre, once again, gives 
us a reason why. He notes that cooperative institutions that are focused on the common good, as 
health care institutions are, will inevitably encounter conflicts with the dominant culture, because 
they are calling into question that culture’s values.25 This happens frequently in nonprofit health 
systems, wherein a mission to care for the poor and promote healthy communities is prioritized 
above maximization of profits. So long as the general culture values financial success above all 
other goods, countercultural institutions will need to compete to continue living their missions 
while exercising good stewardship of resources. For health systems, that necessarily involves 
introducing the external pressures described above. 
 
2. The Current State of Ethics Education in Medical Schools and Residency Programs  
The threats to moral agency I have detailed make it more difficult for clinicians to offer optimal 
care from both a medical and an ethical perspective. Ethics education in medical schools and 
residency programs, however, has not been adequate in preparing students for the threats to their 
moral agency that they will face. First, not enough time is dedicated to ethics education. Second, 
the kind of bioethics that is taught when such training occurs focuses too much on principles and 
quandary ethics and lacks necessary resources to help morally form a person. 
Not enough time is dedicated to ethics education, but that is not because students lack interest. 
Studies have shown that residents are not satisfied with the amount of time given for learning 
ethics, and they know they need more.26 One needs assessment showed that the education being 
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provided is not succeeding at helping clinicians become more comfortable managing ethical 
dilemmas.27 The authors developing these studies are doing good and important work, but the type 
of ethics education they propose in response is not the kind that will help clinicians become better 
moral agents. Unsurprisingly, a survey by Edmund Pellegrino, whose work on the virtues of 
medical practice has been foundational, found moral values “are rarely changed by courses in 
ethics.”28 There is an overemphasis on traditional didactic case-based education and moral 
analyses,29 and a lack of content intended to help students become better moral agents under the 
external pressures they will face. 
Often, “ethics education” for medical students and residents consists of a description of a moral 
quandary of some sort, an acknowledgment of the four principles of bioethics (autonomy, 
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice),30 and then a discussion on how those principles apply 
to the case. These conversations can be excellent tools to help early career clinicians imagine what 
it would be like to encounter a particular ethical dilemma and help them understand nuanced ways 
to respond. Ethics education using cases and principles can push students who are comfortable 
learning science, where clear distinctions between right and wrong answers are more common. 
Through the complexities of ethics, they get exposure to grey areas. But this type of education is 
not sufficient. The mid-level principles of bioethics often do not give direction, as they often 
conflict, and there are not typically clear reasons to prioritize one principle over another. 
In an essay dating from 1978, “What has Ethics to Learn from Medical Ethics?”, MacIntyre 
writes: 
 
the way in which the role of the physician had been put into question by recent 
developments within medicine...[has] left the physician with a set of inherited rules 
which turned out on many types of important occasions to enjoin incompatible 
types of action. Hence the problems of medical ethics appear as a series of 
dilemmas in which moral agents look for good reasons to give weight and authority 
to one rule rather than another in situations of conflict.31 
 
MacIntyre was reflecting on developments in medicine since the early 1900s, but the same kinds 
of changes can be cited in post-ACA contemporary medicine. He continues: 
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what we cannot discover, however, within the stock of justifications advanced 
within recent moral philosophy are any grounds for giving some rules preference 
over others in any situation in which two or more rules provide conflicting 
injunctions. We therefore are left with genuine dilemmas: an agent in each type of 
case considers what to do on a particular occasion and has no means of deciding 
between rules. This is the form in which such problems are presented in most books 
and articles on medical ethics. Presented in this form the problems appear rationally 
insoluble. Presented in this form the problems are rationally insoluble. So the 
student of medical ethics turns to moral philosophy.32 
 
He goes on to describe the failures of moral philosophy to respond to this kind of dilemma, and he 
concludes that good ethics education needs to form the moral character of the person so that she is 
equipped to respond to whatever comes her way.33 Not only is every medical ethics case different 
depending on particularities of the situation, but the kinds of quandaries that arise are often 
completely unpredictable. 
Consider the following common case example. Last week, when he was in and out of 
consciousness, a patient said he was “ready to go” and that, if his heart were to stop, he would not 
want any CPR. This conversation was documented, but no one was sure if he had decisional 
capacity and no formal advance directive exists. Today, the patient is declining, and will likely be 
in cardiac arrest within hours. His family is saying he did not understand what he was saying last 
week and is threatening to sue if the medical team does not attempt resuscitation. The team wants 
to continue discussing why he would have wanted “everything done,” but the clock is ticking and 
eight other patients are waiting to be seen. Training on autonomy and nonmaleficence can help 
someone explain why physicians are unsure if they should perform CPR in this case, but what is 
really needed to provide good care in this circumstance is not knowledge of the principles of 
bioethics. What will actually help is being the kind of physician who is patient and a good 
communicator with the relational skills necessary to be attuned to the emotional needs of grieving 
families. The physician needs to spend the time to do good advance care planning, and to give 
compassionate care to patients and families—which is exactly where it has been found residents 
struggle, given the pressures of efficiency.34 
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As a nursing ethics professor has noted, “the realities of illness, hospital care and the effects of 
diminishing social health care funding are far too complex and particular to be covered by the 
available moral theories and abstract concepts that are still standard fare for courses in health care 
ethics.”35 Typical ethics education does not address a response to the underlying pressures in 
medicine described in the first section of this paper, which cause so much difficulty in ethical 
practice. Nor does it encourage a critical view on what is morally problematic with our current 
systems,36 or train students to become good moral agents by forming their own concepts of the 
ends of their practice while resisting external systems’ attempts to make their ends a physician’s 
end.37 In other words, ethics education needs to prepare clinicians to be moral agents in a medical 
system that is not set up for their flourishing. 
 
3. What Should Healthcare Ethics Education Be Like? 
What would an ideal education in ethics for medical professions be like? My first recommendation 
is obvious: more time needs to be dedicated to ethics in training. That is especially the case given 
that we need to deepen ethics education beyond principles and quandaries. Second, I propose that, 
in addition to a diagnosis of the problem in health care, MacIntyre also gives us the foundational 
content for reforming education. In what follows, I will use MacIntyre’s work to suggest ways in 
which ethics education can change. 
MacIntyre identifies “sociological self-knowledge” as a precondition for fully developing 
moral agency. Sociological self-knowledge is knowing “who you and those around you are in 
terms of your and their roles and relationships to each other, to the common goods of family, 
workplace, and school, and to the structures through which power and money are distributed.38 
Further, it is to “have a grasp of the nature of the roles and relationships in which one is involved, 
of the shared assumptions of those with whom one interacts, of what in those roles, relationships, 
and assumptions obstructs the exercise of rational agency, and of what the possibilities are of acting 
so as to transform them are.”39 More briefly, sociological self-knowledge is a kind of awareness 
that improves an individual’s ability to navigate systems as a moral agent. By being conscious of 
the forces, pressures, and values of the dominant social order, a moral agent can develop the ability 
to rise above or at least resist that social order’s expectations and make better decisions in accord 
with her own values.40 For medical students and residents, developing sociological self-knowledge 
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must mean having a deeper understanding of the pressures they will face working in the U.S. 
healthcare system. Such an understanding is a precondition for resisting the system’s pressures. 
Another way that ethics education in health care can improve is through a commitment not only 
to teaching students about virtue ethics (as most textbooks in medical ethics do), but also to 
fostering their growth in virtue. MacIntyre proposes that virtues “are to be understood as those 
dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to 
practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us 
to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter […].”41 Internal 
goods are those goods that can come only through the practice of an activity. External goods are 
likewise the results of a practice, but they are not achieved solely by practicing that particular 
activity. External goods often come in the form of financial compensation and prestige. They are 
limited resources that provoke competition, on the grounds “that the more someone has of them 
the less there is for other people.”42 Goods internal to the practice of medicine include promoting 
health and healing, developing trusted healing relationships with patients, and honoring their 
human dignity. External goods like financial stability and the esteem that comes from a successful, 
prestigious career are indeed goods, but growth in virtue leads to healthy detachment from 
excessive desire for them. 
To be clear, the formation of virtues is unlikely to happen in a single ethics lecture, case 
discussion group, or ethics course. But meaningful transformation can happen through ongoing 
facilitated conversation, and students can learn tangible practices like asking for and receiving 
feedback, for “we characteristically need the judgement of perceptive and ruthlessly critical 
friends” to act well.43 Even learning mindfulness techniques like noticing a behavior and assessing 
whether or not it is consistent with a chosen virtue can have powerful transformative effects. 
Literature and film can be tools for reflection on oneself and for deepening solidarity with others. 
Likewise, studying work from the disciplines of narrative medicine and medical humanities can 
aid moral formation. 
Reconceptualizing ethics education as moral formation would impact both the clinician’s 
experience of practicing medicine and patient care. Imagine a clinician who develops the humility 
and sociological self-knowledge it takes to recognize and reduce a bias informing the way someone 
cares for patients with addiction. Surely her care for patients with intravenous drug use would 
improve. As a further example, a hospitalist may recognize that the time needed to develop good 
59  Trancik 
  
relationships with a family and engage in advance care planning is worth resisting the pressures of 
efficiency. Virtue education could also have larger-scale organizational results, empowering 
individuals to fight against unjust systems.44 For example, a group of cardiologists sharing the 
virtue of solidarity could decide to join together and create a practice with a greater proportion of 
Medicaid patients, even if it means a reduction in their personal compensation. Cultivating virtues 
will be countercultural, as it “may and often does hinder the achievement of those external goods 
which are the mark of worldly success.”45 
Although they are few in number, programs doing this formative work already exist. The 
Physician’s Formation Program through the Neiswanger Institute for Bioethics and HealthCare 
Leadership at Loyola University Chicago and Duke University’s Theology, Medicine, and Culture 
Fellowship both provide in-depth formation opportunities for healthcare professionals. The 
program at Loyola continues through four years of medical school and helps students explore the 
idea of medicine as a vocation. Duke’s fellowship also offers the opportunity for reflection on 
professional practice from a spiritual perspective. These programs are focusing on teaching goods 
internal to the practice of medicine, and they encourage their students to trust that a commitment 
to pursuit of those goods will make a difference in their institutions.46 If MacIntyre’s critique of 
contemporary modern moral theory is indicative of the pressures of modern day medicine in the 
way I argue here, the only way out of the darkness is through the creation of more programs like 
these. 
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